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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

L E S T E R E . C A N N O N and
M A R G A R E T CANNON,
Plaintiffs and Appellant,

Case No.

vs.

13746

ORVAL W R I G H T ,
Defendant and Respondent. J

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
This was an action to recover the amount due on
a promissory note, together with costs and attorney's
fees on the part of the plaintiffs and a counter-claim
on the part of the Defendant to recover the value of an
air compressor.
D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E L O W E R COURT
This case was tried before the Honorable A. John
Ruggeri, sitting without a jury. The trial court entered
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a judgment against the plaintiffs dismissing the complaint with prejudice, and a judgment of a like nature
against the defendant's Counter-claim. The plaintiffs
moved for new tiral and that motion was overruled and
denied.
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the trial
court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 16, 1963, Lester and Margaret Cannon
became involved in a corporation known as Kolob Acres.
They subsequently acquired sixty-six and two-thirds
percent of the shares of Kolob Corporation and Orval
Wright acquired thirty-three and one-third percent of
the shares of that corporation. (TR. 11). Mr. Cannon
was represented by an attorney from Las Vegas,
Nevada, who was later the attorney for Kolob Acres.
This attorney, Mr. Nitz, defended a condemnation suit
where approximately $45,000.00 was placed in a trust
account for Kolob Acres. (TR. 15). The condemnation
suit was brought by the federal government on certain
real property owned by Kolob Acres for the purpose
of taking said real property. (TR. 17).
The federal government contended there was not
enough water on the condemned property for subdivision
purposes and the corporation thereafter loaned Orval
Wright $6,000.00 pursuant to the promissory note conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cerned with here to develop said water rights so that
the property would be more valuable when condemned.
(TR. 17&18).
Pursuant to that loan Orval Wright was asked
by the attorney, Nitz, to sign a promissory note. Nitz
was attorney for Cannon and his wife who owned twothirds of the corporation at that time. (TR. 11,14). The
promissory note was undated, (TR. 53), to be paid from
the settlement of the lawsuit, Civil No. 114063 and
prepared by Cannon's attorney.
Orval Wright testified on page 23 of the transcript
of trial, line 3 :
Q. Mr. Wright, do you know whether you paid the
note off when the monies were dispersed from the final
fund due and owing Kolob Acres Corporation?
A. When I left that money, everything was supposed to be paid. There was nothing outstanding I knew
about.
Lester Cannon testified on page 32 of the transcript:
Q. So you don't know whether you got the
$6,000.00 from Orval Wright at that time, do you?
A. Well, I know that Orval Wright paid me my
$6,000.00. I didn't issue—attach his part of that trust
account. I didn't attach that. I don't know what was
done with his trust account.
Lester Cannon also testified on page 30 of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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transcript that Orval Wright did not pay him back, but
that he didn't know how much money he got from the
settlement or what it was for.
Thereafter Lester E . Cannon and Margaret Cannon divorced. The ex-wife of Lester Cannon, Margaret
Cannon, gave a release of said promissory note to the
defendant, Orval Wright.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E T R I A L COURT D I D NOT E R R
IN DETERMINING T H E PROMISSORY N O T E W A S CONDITIONAL.
The Uniform Commercial Code, Section 70A-3-105
sets forth the law applicable in the instant case:
#

#

#

(2)

A promissory or order is not unconditional if the instrument

(a)

states that it is subject to or governed
by any other agreement; or

(b)

states that it is to be paid only out of a
particular fund or source except as provided in this section.

The promissory note in this case provides that the
$6,000.00 is to be paid:
". . . on the day payment is received by the
undersigned from the United States governDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment in settlement of Civil Action No. C-11463 in the United States District Court of the
State of Utah, Central Division, and undersigned does hereby assign to payees as security
for this (over) note the sum of $6,000.00 from
any settlement paid the undersigned as a result of said Civil Action No. C-114-63."
Mr. Cannon and his attorney received an initial
payment of $45,000.00 and later received final settlement in Civil Action No. C-114-63. That same attorney
represented the majority stockholders (Lester E . Cannon and Margaret Cannon) and subsequently distributed monies available from the condemnation action.
Orval Wright testified at trial that all obligations
owed by him were paid out of the settlement of Civil
Action No. C-114-63. (TR. 23). Lester Cannon testified he didn't know if he received $6,000.00 from the
settlement of said Civil Action No. C-114-63. (TR. 32).
Plaintiff contends the promissory note was signed
in March of 1964 and the testimony at trial was clear
on the point that final settlement was made sometime
in 1965 and that Mr. Cannon did not make demand for
payment on this promissory note until this lawsuit was
commenced on December 20,1969.
Since Mr. Nitz was handling the matters in and
for Kolob Acres the plaintiff was well aware that the
distribution monies was to be handled by Mr. Nitz.
Nitz was aware of the note and aware of payment due
Mr. Cannon in the settlement of Civil Action No. C-11463. Therefore, plaintiff's contention that money from
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the expected settlement was only "security not personal
obligation of the defendant" is without reason. The intention of both parties is clearly shown by the language
of the note. The language of the note in this case clearly
makes the promise or order conditional as set forth in
Section 70A-3-105 above, as there are no exceptions
under this Section which are applicable to the instant
case.
This court is well aware that under the usual rule
of review the evidence will be surveyed in the light most
favorable to the trial court's findings and judgment.
Buehner Block v. Glezos, 6 U.2d 226, 310 P.2d 517
(1957). The facts here unequivocably point to a writing
or promissory note based upon a condition which must
have been performed before the note was valid. The
facts further show that the plaintiffs were in position
at all times to direct the attorney, Nitz, when making
the settlement as the plaintiffs were the majority stockholders in Kolob Acres. Therefore, since the note was
conditioned and the plaintiff held the key to the performing of the conditions, then the plaintiffs should have
been paid in accordance with the actions initiated by
themselves.
The Supreme Court ruled on a similar issue in the
case of Skousen v. Smith, 27 U.2d 169, 493 P.2d 1003
(1972). In that case the note stated as follows :
" I t is agreed that the drawer of this note
shall not be liable hereunder until and unless
payment is received from . . . Walker on notes
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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executed by him in the total sum of $13,977.70."
The Court then stated:
"We think the nub of this case is whether
the note, subject to this action, became due
and payable when Mr. Smith received a $2,500.00 payment from Walker. The trial court
held that it did and we are constrained too,
and do agree."
The defendant in this case contended that the
promissory note was conditioned on a payment of $13,977.70 from Walker.
Walker did pay $2,500.00 but had not paid the
remainder and the defendant insisted that the note did
not become due because Smith received a $2,500.00
payment from Walker and paid none of this to the defendant Skousen.
The Court stated that the document meant what
it said and was conditioned upon certain payments being
made and that the parties were bound by the language
they deliberately used in their contract, irrespective of
the fact that it might result in improvidence.
In the instant case the parties contracted for payment of a certain promissory note by defendant to plaintiff when certain conditions arose. The trial court found
that the parties were bound by the terms of this promissory note and the Skousen case agrees with this interpretation.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT II
T H E T R I A L COURT D I D NOT E R R
IN DETERMINING THAT BOTH
P A R T I E S TO T H E P R O M I S S O R Y
NOTE W E R E BOUND BY T H E DISTRIBUTION AND SETTLEMENT IN
C I V I L CASE NO. C-114-63.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code cited in
Point I and the Skousen case, the law in the State of
Utah is that a promissory note can be conditional and
the promissory note in the instant case is conditional
because both parties agreed to the writing set forth on
the promissory note and there was no testimony at the
trial otherwise.
The trial court found that the plaintiffs were
parties to the distribution and settlement and were bound
by said distribution and settlement.
Apparently the Court realized that the plaintiffs
were the majority stockholders in Kolob Acres and
that plaintiffs hired the attorney who represented Kolob
Acres in the condemnation action and said plaintiffs also
had their attorney hold the initial money in trust and
also the final payment and thereafter distributed said
money.
The defendant testified that he simply took the
money that was given to him by the plaintiff's attorney.
Since the note was conditional and plaintiff's made
distribution through their attorney, the trial court simDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ply found that the plaintiffs should have exercised whatever conditions applied to said promissory note at the
time of settlement and as far as the transcript or trial
goes, it may be that plaintiff was paid at that time, as
the plaintiff, Lester Cannon, did not specifically testify
that he did not receive his $6,000.00 from the setlement.
POINT III
T H E T R I A L COURT D I D N O T E R R
IN FINDING THAT T H E PLAINT I F F , M A R G A R E T CANNON, N O W
KNOWN AS M A R G A R E T S U L L I N S ,
G A V E A F U L L R E L E A S E TO T H E
DEFENDANT,
ORVAL
WRIGHT,
FOR
ALL
DEBTS, PAST
AND
PRESENT.
The promissory note in this case was made payable
to Lester E. Cannon and Margaret Cannon, and/or
order.
Such a note is governed by Section 70A-3-110,
Utah Code Ann. (1953):
70A-3-110. Payable to order. - - (1) An
instrument is payable to order when by its
terms it is payable to the order or assigns
of any person therein specified with reasonable
certainty, or to him or his order, or when it
is conspicuously designated on its face as "exchange" or the like and names a payee. I t is
payable to the order of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(a)

the maker or drawer; or

(b)

the drawee; or

(c)

a payee who is not maker, drawer or
drawee; or

(d) two or more payees together or in the
alternative; or
(e) an estate, trust or fund, in which case
it is payable to the order of the representative of such estate, trust or fund or his
successors; or
(f)

an office, or an officer by his title as
such in which case it is payable principal
but the incumbent of the office or his
successors may act as if he or they were
the holder; or
(g) a partnership or unincorporated association, in which case it is payable to the
partnership or association and may be indorsed or transferred by any person thereto authorized.
I n this case the promissory note was made payable
to Lester E . Cannon and Margaret Cannon and/or
order, and under Section 70A-3-110 the note is made
payable to order because it is payable to plaintiffs or
their order. Because the note is made payable to order,
then under 70A-3-110(d) it is payable to the order of
two or more payees together or in the alternative.
Under this Section the note is payable, in the alternative, to Margaret Cannon, also known as Margaret
Cannon Sullins.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I t would appear that the plaintiff, Lester Cannon,
got all that he deserved out of the settlement which was
a condition of promissory note for the reason that Margaret Cannon felt that she gained her just due under
the promissory note and gave a release of said note.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff, Lester Cannon, testified that he did not
receive the $6,000.00 and he also testified that he did
receive it.
Plaintiff, Margaret Cannon gave a complete release indicating that the note was paid. The note was
conditional and Lester Cannon, through his attorney was
in charge of initiating the conditions.
Therefore, it appears that the trial court found the
evidence did not preponderate in favor of plaintiffs and
the Complaint and Counterclaim were dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
M I C H A E L W. P A R K , Esq.
99 North Main Street
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Attorney for Defendant
and Respondent
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